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CRIMINAL LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT—ROADBLOCKS 
ESTABLISHED FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF DRUG INTERDICTION ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000). 
In August 1998, the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) 
began to utilize vehicle checkpoints as a method to curb narcotics 
trafficking.  Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2000).  The 
checkpoint locations were typically selected on the basis of high 
traffic volume and proximity to high-crime areas.  Id. at 451.  
Members of the IPD who conducted the stops did not stop vehicles 
based on any discernable characteristics.  Id. at 450-51.  Instead, a 
predetermined number of vehicles were detained at a given 
checkpoint.  Most vehicles were stopped during daylight hours and 
detained for less than five minutes.  Id. at 451.  While stopped, 
officers required motorists to produce their driver licenses and 
automobile registrations, observed drivers for sign of intoxication, 
and walked a drug-sniffing dog around the outside of the vehicles.  
Id. at 450-51. 
Between August and November of 1998, the IPD conducted six 
checkpoints and stopped a total of 1,161 vehicles.  Id. at 450.  One 
hundred and four motorists were arrested as a result, representing 
nine percent of the total.  Although fifty-five individuals were 
charged with drug related crimes, forty-nine individuals were 
arrested on non-drug related charges. 
Late in September 1998, James Edmond and Joell Palmer were 
stopped individually at one of the IPD’s checkpoints.  Id. at 451.  The 
two initiated a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of 
motorists who were stopped or who were subject to being detained 
at roadblocks.  The lawsuit alleged that the IPD’s narcotics 
checkpoints violated their Fourth Amendment rights and their 
rights under the Indiana Constitution.  Edmond and Palmer 
requested damages and attorney’s fees for themselves; they sought 
declaratory relief and moved for a preliminary injunction on behalf 
of themselves and the class. 
Although the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana agreed to certify the class, it refused to grant the 
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preliminary injunction, holding that the IPD’s narcotics roadblocks 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  In a split decision, the 
United States Court of  
 
 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the narcotics 
checkpoints were violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  Id. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the IPD’s program violated rights protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  In affirming the Court of Appeals, the 
Court held that a checkpoint program violates the Fourth 
Amendment when its primary purpose is a “general interest in 
crime control.” Id. at 451, 457. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the six person majority, began the 
Court’s analysis by explaining that a search or seizure requires an 
element of individualized suspicion to be considered reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 451.  The Court emphasized 
that only in limited circumstances does the rule of individualized 
suspicion not apply.  Id.  The Court then cited four examples of 
instances when individualized suspicion is not required to conduct 
a search or seizure.  Id. at 451-53. 
First, the Court referred to the “special needs” exception, which 
includes random drug testing of student athletes, customs 
employees, and railroad employees involved in accidents.  Id. at 451 
(citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)). 
Second, the Court explained that generalized searches for 
limited administrative purposes, such as government inspections of 
certain businesses, inspections to determine the cause of a fire, and 
housing compliance inspections, were permissible.  Id. at 452 (citing 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). 
Third, the Court discussed why roadblocks conducted by the 
United States Border Patrol are considered to be constitutionally 
permissible.  Id.  Referring to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 551-54 (1976), the Court described the “particular context” 
surrounding the issue of border checkpoints.  Id.  The Court recalled 
its application of a balancing test in Martinez-Fuerte that weighed the 
Government’s interest in curbing the flow of illegal aliens across the 
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Nation’s borders with an individual’s interest against unreasonable 
searches.  Id.  (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-64).  
Recognizing the difficulties faced by the Government in halting 
illegal border traffic, the daunting prospect of discerning whether 
particular cars are carrying illegal aliens, and the “relatively modest 
degree of intrusion entailed by the stops,” the Court held that the 
balance weighed in the Government’s favor.  Id.  (citing Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-64). 
Finally, the Court justified Michigan Department of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), a decision holding that sobriety checkpoints 
were constitutional.  Id.  The Court reasoned that stops to detect 
intoxicated motorists were permissible because the checkpoints 
were intended to reduce the danger of drunk drivers on roadways 
and because an obvious connection existed between the need for 
highway safety and the use of suspicionless searches at roadblocks.  
Id. at 453.  The Court also noted that although random suspicionless 
stops of motorists to check licenses and motor vehicle registration 
are unconstitutional, the “questioning of all oncoming traffic at 
roadblock-type stops” is constitutionally permissible.  Id.  (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).  The Court specifically 
designated these stops as valid because they further highway safety, 
and are not simply the means to advance a general interest in crime 
control.  Id. 
Before delving into its analysis of the IPD’s narcotics 
checkpoint program, the Court clarified that highway checkpoints 
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 454.  
However, the majority also declared that the IPD’s use of a drug-
sniffing dog to investigate the exterior of automobiles does not 
cause checkpoints to become a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 453.  Instead, looking to the primary 
purpose of the IPD’s checkpoints, the Court distinguished the 
Indianapolis program from those checkpoints deemed 
constitutional.  Id. 
Justice O’Connor continued the majority opinion, emphasizing 
that the Court was “particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to 
the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental 
authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.”  Id. at 
455.  Furthermore, the Court differentiated the IPD’s narcotics 
roadblocks from the sobriety checkpoints at issue in Sitz.  Id.  
Though the Court conceded that drug interdiction checkpoints 
would further community interests by removing drugs from the 
street, unlike the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz the IPD’s roadblocks 
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did not serve to eradicate any immediate threat to highway safety.  
Id. 
Moreover, the Court refused to recognize the IPD’s argument 
that the narcotics roadblocks were analogous to the Border Patrol 
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.  Id.  The Court admitted that the 
roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte were designed to promote the 
Government’s interest in controlling the flow of illegal aliens across 
the United States’ borders, but held that governmental interest alone 
often cannot justify “a regime of suspicionless searches or seizures.”  
Id.  Instead, the Court concluded, the nature of such a program must 
be carefully examined to determine the program’s principle 
purpose.  Id. 
 
Next, the Court dismissed the IPD’s reliance upon Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) to justify suspicionless stops.  Id. at 
456.  Justice O’Connor clarified the Court’s holding in Whren, stating 
that although the actual, subjective motivations of officers are not 
pertinent to determining the constitutionality of traffic stops, Whren 
does not apply to “cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant 
to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion.”  Id.  In these 
cases, the Court held that an inquiry into the program’s purpose is 
appropriate.  Id. 
Finally, the Court disagreed with the IPD’s argument that the 
stops were justifiable because the checkpoints served the secondary 
purposes of removing intoxicated motorists from the highway and 
verifying drivers’ licenses and automobile registrations.  Id. at 457.  
The Court rejected the IPD’s position, holding that if this logic were 
applied, “law enforcement authorities would be able to establish 
checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included 
a license or sobriety check.”  Id.  To prevent such ad hoc justification, 
the Court declared that the primary purpose of the checkpoint 
program must be discerned.  Id. 
The Court emphasized that, in constitutional situations such as 
these, the reasoning of Whren should apply, and an inquiry into the 
subjective motivations of officers should not be conducted.  Id.  The 
Court also noted that in emergency situations, such as preventing 
the threat of a terrorist attack or catching a dangerous fugitive, law 
enforcement agencies could establish checkpoints related to a 
general interest in crime control.  Id.  In the instant case, however, 
the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding that because the 
primary purpose of the IPD’s narcotics checkpoints was to promote 
a general interest in crime control, the program violated the Fourth 
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Amendment.  Id. at 458. 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, 
and joined by Justice Scalia as to Part I, attacked the majority 
opinion, and characterized the IPD’s checkpoints as “legitimate 
seizures.”  Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In Part I of his dissenting 
opinion, the Chief Justice cited Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1976), 
which held that roadblocks are constitutional if they are “carried out 
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers.”  Id.  The Chief Justice then applied 
the Court’s reasoning in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to the case at bar.  
Id.  Stating that “this case follows naturally from Martinez-Fuerte and 
Sitz,”  Chief Justice Rehnquist defended the constitutionality of the 
IPD’s checkpoints, asserting that  
 
 
 
 
although the primary purpose of the IPD’s roadblocks was to curb 
illegal narcotics trafficking, that fact should not determine the 
program’s constitutionality.  Id. at 459  (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
Turning to the Court’s holdings in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and 
Prouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the IPD’s narcotics 
checkpoints to be constitutional because officers were instructed to 
“look for signs of impairment” and to check the validity of driver’s 
licenses and automobile registrations.  Id.  As the IPD’s roadblocks 
served these legitimate state interests, the Chief Justice asserted that 
it was “constitutionally irrelevant” that the IPD also intended to 
curb drug trafficking.  Id. 
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied Whren to the present case.  
Id.  The Chief Justice noted that an inquiry into the subjective intent 
of the IPD or city council was improper because the roadblocks 
served legitimate state interests with minimal intrusion, and were 
thus objectively reasonable.  Id. at 459-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  Concluding Part I, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that 
the IPD’s narcotics checkpoint program was constitutional under 
the Brown standard because it served two important state interests, 
and because the stops were conducted in an objectively reasonable 
amount of time, in a neutral manner, and with a subjectively 
reasonable level of intrusion.  Id. at 460.  The Chief Justice noted that 
the use of a drug-sniffing dog marked the one difference between 
prior Supreme Court precedents and the instant case, and 
maintained that the use of trained narcotics dogs should not 
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invalidate the constitutionality of the IPD’s checkpoints, as the 
Court had previously declared dog-sniff inspections constitutional.  
Id.  (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). 
The Chief Justice introduced Part II of the dissent by criticizing 
the majority’s decision to add “a new non-law-enforcement primary 
purpose test” to roadblock seizures.  Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
opposed applying a “special needs” test to roadblock seizures, 
because automobiles are traditionally afforded less privacy than 
private dwellings.  Id. at 461 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief 
Justice again concluded that the Brown balancing test formed the 
appropriate inquiry, because individuals detained at roadblocks had 
a lower expectation of privacy and because the stops were brief and 
nonintrusive.  Id.  Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that 
the purpose of highway checkpoints is determinative of their 
constitutionality, roadblocks identical to those approved in Sitz and 
Martinez-Fuerte run the risk of being invalidated by juries who 
determine that a “forbidden purpose” was present.  Id. at 461-62 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 
In closing, the Chief Justice emphasized the need for the Court 
to adhere to the notion of stare decisis, and underscored the 
important public safety benefits that narcotics checkpoints similar to 
the IPD’s encouraged.  Id. at 462 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist concluded the dissent by declaring that the IPD’s 
roadblocks, together with the dog sniffs, were consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion, criticizing 
the Court’s decisions in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte.  Id. (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). The Justice explained that a system of suspicionless 
stops at highway checkpoints ran afoul of the Framers 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Although Justice 
Thomas doubted that the checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte 
comported with the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” 
requirement, the Justice was disinclined to deem them 
unconstitutional “without the benefit of briefing and argument.”  Id.  
Despite reservations regarding the validity of the Court’s previous 
decisions, Justice Thomas joined the Chief Justice’s opinion that 
established case law obligated the Court to uphold the IPD’s 
program.  Id. 
Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures is a highly charged issue.  In this well-intentioned opinion, 
the Court attempted to fairly balance a city’s crime prevention goals 
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with the fundamental rights of that city’s citizens and persons 
passing through its jurisdiction.  Although the majority’s ultimate 
resolution of this dilemma affirmed the Court’s desire to protect 
individual liberties, one link in its chain of reasoning is flawed: the 
Court failed to effectively illustrate why the precedent established 
by Martinez-Fuerte did not apply to this matter.  Like the Border 
Patrol in Martinez-Fuerte, which wanted to control the flow of illegal 
immigrants across United States borders, the IPD in this case hoped 
to control the flow of illegal narcotics through Indianapolis.  The 
Court approved the Border Patrol’s scheme in Martinez-Fuerte, 
reasoning that the Government experienced great difficulties in 
determining which cars carried illegal aliens.  Here, the IPD, like 
other police departments across the United States, found it difficult 
to determine which cars carried illegal narcotics.  In both situations, 
the degree of intrusion caused by the stops was relatively modest. 
The Court’s decision to prohibit narcotics checkpoints runs 
afoul of the analogous constitutional precedent set forth in Martinez-
Fuerte.  Interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid a “general 
interest in crime control” appears to be inconsistent with the Court’s 
earlier decision to reduce Fourth Amendment protection as a 
method to promote a general interest in controlling illegal border 
crossings.  Despite the positive impact this case will have on 
individual liberties, its beneficial aspects may be overshadowed by 
the inconsistent application of Supreme Court precedent.  
Furthermore, because of its incongruous application of prior law, 
this case is likely to confuse other Fourth Amendment matters that 
may arise in the future. 
Meredith Boylan 
 
